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Executive Summary
It is widely recognized that rising sanitary and 
phytosanitary [SPS) standards have created numer­
ous obstacles to the international exchange of agri­
cultural commodities. The issue is of particular 
importance for developing countries with abundant 
agricultural resources as they seek to expand their 
exports of labor-intensive, high-value-added agricul­
tural products to the more lucrative developed- 
country markets. Agricultural exporters in devel­
oping countries are often required to meet strin­
gent developed-country SPS standards. Not only 
are these standards much higher than international 
standards and those prevailing in developing coun­
tries, but they are also subject to frequent [usually 
upward) revisions.
China is a large agricultural producer and exporter. 
As China's agricultural trade continues to increase, 
the country has experienced more challenges in 
meeting the SPS standards set by its trade partners. 
While some of the SPS standards are legitimate and 
necessary for protecting human, animal, and plant 
health, others are considered to be disguised forms 
of protection. Concern in China has grown that 
technical regulations such as the SPS standards are 
increasingly being used to discriminate against 
some of its exports. The European Union [EU), 
Japan, and the United States are the three markets 
in which China has encountered the most SPS 
barriers.
Because of the difficulty of challenging foreign SPS 
barriers, it is considered more practical to meet 
these high foreign standards. To this end, China 
has enacted many laws and regulations on food and 
agricultural production. Despite efforts, many 
problems exist in China's food safety regulatory 
system. First, domestic food regulations are usually 
not consistent with or are less restrictive than 
international standards. Second, there is little coor­
dination among the various government ministries 
and agencies when they establish agricultural stand­
ards and food safety controls. Third, the lack of 
technical, institutional, and managerial capacity to 
control and ensure compliance makes the 
regulations and standards ineffective.
Capacity building in both the public and the private 
sector will help China move toward better food 
safety status and create more trade opportunities. 
The private sector, including the farm sector, has
the main responsibility for producing and selling 
safe food. Attracting more foreign direct invest­
ment [FDI) and establishing Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems and coor­
dinated supply chain management in agriculture 
should be the main focus. The government, how­
ever, sets the framework within which the private 
sector operates, and the role of the public sector in 
organizing public services and promoting food 
safety should be emphasized.
Your assignment is to develop strategies that China 
can use to enhance its capacity to meet food 
export quality standards, taking into account the 
financial, institutional, and technical constraints it is 
facing.
Background
Food safety risks refer to the potential hazards 
associated with food that can cause ill health in 
humans, animals, and plants.1 In both developing 
and developed countries, foodborne illnesses and 
dissemination of pests or invasive species have 
become an increasingly important public health and 
environmental issue, imposing a significant burden 
on communities and their economic systems. In 
recent years, in response to an increasing number 
of food safety problems and rising consumer con­
cerns about foodborne hazards, governments all 
over the world are intensifying their efforts to 
regulate their food sectors and strengthening their 
domestic sanitary and phytosanitary [SPS) standards.
Rising SPS standards have created numerous 
obstacles to the international exchange of agricul­
tural commodities. The issue is of particular impor­
tance for developing countries with abundant agri­
cultural resources as they seek to expand their 
exports of labor-intensive and high-value-added 
agricultural products to the more lucrative devel­
oped-country markets. Agricultural exporters in 
developing countries are often required to meet 
stringent developed-country SPS standards by
1 Flazards include those associated with microbial 
pathogens, pesticides and veterinary pharmaceuticals, 
environmental contaminants (for example, heavy metals), 
naturally occurring toxins (for example, mycotoxins), and 
the spread of plant pests and animal diseases.
demonstrating that their products do not endanger 
native species or human health in the importing 
country. Not only are these standards much higher 
than international standards as well as those pre­
vailing in developing countries, but they are also 
subject to frequent [usually upward) revision. 
Higher SPS standards significantly increase the 
exporting costs, and failure to meet the standards 
is usually disastrous for exporters in developing 
countries.
Policymakers acknowledge that the increasing SPS 
standards in the developed world are due in part to 
growing consumer demand for food safety as well 
as advances in scientific knowledge about food- 
borne hazards. They also recognize, however, that 
the disingenuous use of the standards can provide a 
nontransparent means of impeding trade for 
protectionist purposes. Such protectionist efforts 
have become more apparent as traditional trade 
barriers like tariffs and quantitative restrictions on 
trade in agricultural and food products continue to 
decline. The proliferation of SPS-related trade 
disputes in the 1980s and 1990s led to the creation 
of a set of new disciplines on the use of SPS meas­
ures in the Uruguay Round negations—that is, the 
SPS Agreement in 1995. Since 1995 the role of the 
SPS Agreement in averting trade-distorting SPS 
standards has increasingly been recognized.
In principle, the SPS Agreement and the associated 
World Trade Organization [WTO] dispute settle­
ment mechanism can ensure that SPS standards are 
not abused or misused for protectionist aims. But 
in practice developing countries are usually placed 
at a disadvantage when it comes to making use of 
these procedures. They are especially hampered by 
the lack of resources for meeting these standards 
and constrained by their limited institutional and 
political power for challenging unfair treatment 
[Hoekman and Mavroidis 2000; Busch and 
Reinhardt 2003).2 As a result, issues related to the 
impact of SPS standards on developing-country
2 An article in the SPS Agreement specifically promotes 
the provision of technical assistance to developing coun­
tries [Article 9). A related provision is the special and 
differential treatment, which stipulates that in applying 
SPS measures, the special needs of developing countries 
should be accounted for and a phas^in period for com­
pliance with the SPS Agreement may be granted [Article 
10). According to the literature, whether these provisions 
actually benefit developing countries is arguable [see 
Hoekman et al. 2004).
agricultural trade, as well as the role of the SPS 
Agreement in addressing SPS-related trade disputes, 
remain at the forefront of the ongoing global trade 
policy debate.
There is a voluminous literature on the legal and 
institutional aspects of SPS issues. Few attempts 
have been made, however, to examine the problems 
faced by governments and exporting firms in 
developing countries in meeting these challenges. 
This information gap makes it difficult for devel­
oping countries to address their own supply-side 
problems. It also makes it difficult to conduct the 
current policy dialogue between developing and 
developed countries on this important issue in an 
informed and cooperative manner.
The purpose of this case study is to fill this knowl­
edge gap. Drawing on the experience of China, the 
largest developing-country exporter of several agri­
cultural commodities, this study aims to contribute 
to the understanding of the impact of international 
food safety regulations on agricultural trade, par­
ticularly on high-value-added products; to identify 
the policy, institutional, and technical problems 
faced by producers and exporters in meeting these 
requirements; and to identify appropriate policy 
responses to address these problems.
China's Agricultural Trade Patterns
Broad economic reforms initiated in 1978 brought 
rapid economic growth to China, and the country 
witnessed major changes in policies, which gradually 
shifted from central planning to more reliance on 
market mechanisms. During this period, China's 
agricultural sector has grown strongly. China alone 
accounts for one-fifth of world agricultural produc­
tion. It became the 143rd member of the WTO on 
December II, 2001, and the value of its agricultural 
trade continues to increase. In 2004 the total value 
of Chinese agricultural trade reached US$50.2 
billion [imports plus exports), an increase of 
US$20.8 billion from 2001 [Figure 1). Agricultural 
exports and imports were US$17.3 billion and 
US$32.9 billion, respectively, in 2004, resulting in a 
record high agricultural trade deficit of US$15.6 
billion. The rise of the agricultural trade deficit in 
recent years is due primarily to the dramatic 
increase in domestic demand for grain, cotton, and 
sugar.
Figure 1: Chinese Agricultural Im ports and Exports, 1980-2004
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China statistical yearbook, various years.
Adjustments in China's trade policy, including tariff 
reduction policies, have significantly changed 
China's agricultural export and import structure. 
Agricultural trade has moved in a direction that is 
more consistent with China's comparative advantage 
[Hayes and Fuller 1999], For example, the propor­
tion of grain exports fell to 20 percent of total 
agricultural exports in the 1990s, from more than 
40 percent in the 1980s [Huang and Rozelle 2002], 
Horticultural, animal, and aquatic products 
accounted for more than 80 percent of agricultural 
exports in the late 1990s. By re-grouping trade data 
according to factor intensity in production, Huang 
and Rozelle conclude that China's net exports of 
land-intensive bulk commodities, such as grains, 
oilseeds, and sugar crops, have fallen, while exports 
of high-value and more labor-intensive commodities 
have risen. Similar trade patterns were observed in 
an earlier study by Carter and Li [1999],
The Impact of SPS Barriers
Before 2001, Chinese farmers and exporters had 
generally anticipated that China's WTO accession 
would have a large, positive impact on agricultural
production and exports, especially for labor- 
intensive agricultural products. These expectations 
have largely not been borne out during the post- 
WTO years. With a few exceptions, most agricul­
tural products in which China maintains a compara­
tive advantage have not performed strongly in 
export markets. In fact, many of them have 
suffered significant losses. The products hardest hit 
are usually those subject to stringent foreign SPS 
standards.
As China's agricultural trade continues to increase, 
the country has experienced more challenges in 
meeting the SPS standards set by its trade partners. 
Concern has grown that technical regulations such 
as the SPS standards are being used to discriminate 
against some of its exports. But neither the scope 
of this problem nor the economic consequences 
have been fully identified. Some reports suggest 
that such barriers pose a very high cost in terms of 
lost export sales. For example, one Ministry of 
Commerce report concludes that almost 90  
percent of Chinese agricultural exports faced over­
seas technical barriers that resulted in US$9 billion 
of lost export sales [Zhu 2003], According to  an
official government newspaper, about US$7.4 
billion of exports from China were lost annually 
owing to increasing technical barriers [People's 
Daily 2002],
Despite these estimates of large aggregate effects of 
technical barriers, China has pursued only a few 
cases of technical barrier disputes through the 
informal or formal dispute settlement processes 
established by the WTO. Through 2004, China 
had raised nine informal challenges within the
WTO SPS Committee to regulations affecting its 
exports: three concerning the EU [over maximum 
residue limits and regulations on aflatoxins and 
ocratoxin A in foods for infants and young chil­
dren], three concerning Japan [over the amendment 
of a food sanitation law and standards for food 
additives], one concerning the Philippines [over 
fruit regulations], and two concerning the United 
States [over rules on materials derived from cattle 
and restrictions on potted plants] [Box 1],
Box 1: SPS Concerns Raised By China 
Food Safety
• European Communities—Notification G/SPS/N/EEC/236 and 237 on maximum residue 
levels for pesticides on food
• European Communities—Notification G/SPS/N/EEC/223/Add.l on EC regulation on 
aflatoxins and Ocratoxin A in foods for infants and young children
• European Communities—Notification G/SPS/N/EEC/196 and Add.l on maximum residue 
levels in pesticides
• Japan—amendment of the food sanitation law
• Japan—Notification G/SPS/N/JPN/104 on the revision of standards and specifications for 
food and additives
• Japan—Notification G/SPS/N/121 on standards and specifications for food additives 
[boscalid]
Animal Health and Zoonoses
• United States—Notification G/SPS/N/USA/933 and G/SPS/N/USA/934 on U.S. rule 
on materials derived from cattle and record keeping requirements
Plant Health Concerns
• United States—Restrictions on imports of Chinese potted plants in growing medium
• Philippines—Notification on Chinese fruit
Source: WTO 2005.
In addition to the informal notifications China has 
made to the WTO [none of which has advanced to 
the formal dispute settlement process], disputes in 
other venues concern pesticide residue limits and 
inspection requirements viewed as excessive for 
Chinese vegetable exports to Japan, restrictions on 
poultry meat and eels by Japan, EU restrictions on 
products of animal origin, poultry products, 
peanuts, shrimp, tea, and honey, and restrictions by 
the United States on Iongams, Iychees, apples, and 
pears [Cheng 2005J.
Import Refusals
China's recent experiences with SPS barriers have 
been mainly with the EU, Japan, and the United 
States.3 Table 1 presents a summary of import 
refusals for Chinese food and agricultural products 
during 2004 and 2005. Overall, the total number 
of import refusals by these three major markets 
remained stable between 2004 and 2005. There 
was an increase in refusals by the United States [3.7 
percent] and the EU [20.5 percent], but the 
numbers were nearly offset by the decrease by 
Japan [-20.1 percent]. Among the three markets, 
the United States had by far the most import 
refusals, followed by Japan and the EU. When, 
however, the number of refusals is compared with 
the respective export value of agricultural products, 
a slightly different result is obtained. Although the 
United States still maintains the highest refusal rate, 
this rate is lower for Japan than for the EU because 
the value of agricultural exports to Japan is more 
than double that to the EU. In recent years Japan 
has been China's largest agricultural trading 
partner, importing approximately US$8 billion from 
China in 2005.
China's agricultural and food exports suffering 
from foreign SPS barriers cover a wide range of 
products, including processed food products, agri­
cultural products, pharmaceutical products, live­
stock products, fishery products, and forestry 
products.4 Table 2 shows the number of refusals 
for each category of products in the EU, Japan, 
and the United States in 2005. It can be seen that
3 In 2005 SPS-related import refusals of China's agricul­
tural and food products totaled 1,985, of which 1,634, or 
82.3 percent, originate from the EU, Japan, and the United States.
4 In this section, "food and agricultural products" also cover pharmaceutical products.
import refusals are concentrated in three product 
categories: processed food, agricultural products, 
and pharmaceutical products. Together they 
account for 90.3 percent of all import refusals in 
the three regions in 2005. Import refusals in 
pharmaceutical products are significant for the 
United States, totaling 312 cases in 2005, but not 
for the EU and Japan—only 3 cases were reported 
in Japan. For these two countries/regions, exports 
of livestock products seem to be more problematic 
than pharmaceutical products. For all three regions, 
import refusals occur less frequently in fishery and 
forestry products.
Two considerations are important in interpreting 
these refusal data. First, the products reported as 
"refusals" may subsequently gain access to the 
export market. For example, under the current U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration [FDA] detention 
system, a product placed on automatic detention 
may resume normal entry when the shipper or 
importer proves that the product meets FDA 
standards. "Refusal" is thus not a final rejection, 
since there is the possibility that some products 
could later be released with proper documentation 
and re-examination. No data on such releases are 
obtainable, however. If the product is finally 
refused, the importer is required to either re­
export or destroy the article.
A second important consideration regarding the 
import refusal data is that they are count data and 
do not reflect the dollar value of Chinese food and 
agricultural products refused entry to the foreign 
markets. The value of refused products relative to 
the value of imports is the most direct measure of 
the challenges encountered at border inspection. 
Unfortunately, this measure cannot be calculated 
owing to the lack of value data for refused ship­
ments. A rough measure of relative refusal rates 
can be made by comparing the number of refusals 
to the value of agricultural and food products 
imported in a certain year, as discussed earlier.
Table 1: Im port Refusals b y  the EU , japan, and the United States, 2 0 0 4  and2 0 0 5
Total agricultural exports
Importing __________ Number of refusals_________________________ [billion US$1______
country 2004 2005 Change (%) 2004 2005 Change (%)
United States 1,138 1,180 3.7 2.3 2.8 22.5
EU 146 176 20.5 2.6 3.5 33.5
Japan 348 278 -20.1 7.4 7.9 7.2
Total 1,632 1,634 0.1 12.3 14.2 15.6
Source: GAQSIQ 2006.
Table 2 : Im port Refusals b y  Product Categoiy in 2 0 0 5
Product category
United
States EU Japan Total
Processed food products 448 49 195 692
Agricultural products 328 96 44 468
Pharmaceutical products 312 0 3 315
Livestock products 18 20 22 60
Fishery products 15 1 12 28
Forestry products 2 3 0 5
Others 57 7 2 66
Total 1,180 176 278 1,634
Source: GAQSIQ 2006.
Stakeholders
In China, exports of agricultural and food 
products, especially those in which China has a 
comparative advantage, offer opportunities to 
producers, processors, and traders. These exports 
are particularly important for poor families with 
abundant labor and limited land, since producing 
labor-intensive export-oriented commodities allows 
for far higher production value, income, and 
employment per hectare than land-intensive com­
modities such as grain crops and soybeans.
Fruit and vegetable production can be used as an 
example [World Bank 2005]: in 2000 the number 
of days of labor input per mu [0.067 hectare] was 
12 for maize, 10 for wheat, and 15 for rice but
increased to 44 for apples, 81 for tomatoes, and 74 
for cucumbers. Net value added in renminbi [RMB] 
per mu was 185 for maize, 115 for wheat, 279 for 
rice, 985 for apples, 1,717 for tomatoes, and 1,172 
for cucumbers. Exports of higher-quality fruits and 
vegetable for demanding foreign buyers may 
require additional labor input and generate more 
value added both on the farm and during 
processing and packing at the postharvest stage.
Foreign SPS barriers have a direct impact on the 
welfare of smallholder farmers producing high- 
value-added, labor-intensive agricultural commodi­
ties. The magnitude of such impacts is, however, 
hard to measure at the micro level. Available data
at more aggregate levels indicate that these barriers 
can lead to substantial losses in terms of lost 
export sales. Three broad categories of products— 
fruits and vegetables, products of animal origin, 
and honey and tea—have been affected the most. 
Correspondingly, major domestic stakeholders are 
farmers and exporters of these products and 
foreign stakeholders are the EU, Japan, and the 
United States.5
Fruits and Vegetables
China's fruit and vegetable sector has become one 
of the fastest-growing sectors of agricultural 
production in the past decade. Fruit and vegetable 
production reached 145 million metric tons and 
540 million metric tons, respectively, in 2003. 
Although this volume of output is large, only a 
small portion [less than 1 percent) is exported. Japan 
is the dominant export destination for China's 
vegetables and fruits. Vegetable exports to Japan 
accounted for 25 percent of the volume and 40 
percent of the value of total vegetable and fruit 
exports, and fruit exports to Japan accounted for 11 
percent of the volume and 22 percent of the value. 
Besides Japan, other major markets for Chinese 
fruit and vegetable exports are the EU, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, and the United 
States.
China's continued role as a major supplier of fruits 
and vegetables to Japan depends on how Chinese 
food producers and processors respond to the 
increased demand for food safety by Japanese 
consumers. A case in point is China's spinach 
exports to Japan. Before 2002, 99 percent of 
Japan's annual spinach imports came from China. In 
July 2002, owing to an excess of residues of agri­
cultural chemicals detected in imported Chinese 
vegetables, Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare [MHLWJ reinforced safety inspections of 
Chinese vegetables at the border and promulgated 
an import ban on frozen spinach from China. This
5 Within these countries, producers and consumers are 
both stakeholders who may have potentially different 
interests. When the SPS barriers are implemented to 
protect domestic producers, consumers lose as result of 
trade limitation and price increase. When the SPS barriers 
are based on science and serve legitimate purposes, how­
ever, consumers may gain from enhanced food safety 
[even though the price they pay still increases], in either 
case, producers in importing countries are beneficiaries 
of the SPS barriers.
prohibition lasted about eight months till February 
2003. But in May 2003 Japan again prohibited 
importers from purchasing Chinese frozen spinach 
after detecting higher than permitted levels of 
pesticide residue. Export of spinach did not resume 
until July 2004, when the MHLW lifted the ban 
and allowed frozen spinach to be imported from 27 
authorized Chinese companies.
Although the ban on spinach has been lifted, it was 
a major disruption in trade from China to Japan, 
not only for spinach, but also for vegetables and 
fruits in general. Many Japanese and Chinese com­
panies incurred heavy financial losses on stocks of 
product and on current contracts. The ban resulted 
in increased commercial risks for importers and 
food retailers. Moreover, it had a lasting negative 
impact on Japanese consumers' confidence in the 
safety and quality of Chinese fruits and vegetables 
and negatively affected their buying attitudes. Con­
sequently, prices of imported Chinese fruit and 
vegetable products in the Japanese market declined, 
and Japan's share in total Chinese exports dropped.
The problems with frozen spinach are not the only 
ones for Chinese fruit and vegetable exports to 
Japan. Problems occur occasionally with other 
products, including fresh cabbage, fresh peas, fresh 
celery, and peanuts. Most cases of noncompliance 
with food safety in the Japanese fruit and vegetable 
market are related to pesticide residues. Phytosani­
tary constraints, however, are also important. 
Currently, Japan's Plant Protection Law stipulates 16 
types of plant pests and diseases in foreign coun­
tries that are major quarantine concerns, and 5 
types are relevant for trade with China: oriental 
fruit fly [Bactrocera dorsalis species complex); 
melon fly [Dacus cucurbitae); codling moth [Cydia 
pomonella); sweet potato weevil; and rice stem 
nematode.
Products of Animal Origin
China is also a significant player in world trade of 
meat and fishery products. Major export markets 
for these products include the EU, Hong Kong, 
Japan, South Korea, Russia, and some countries in 
the Middle East [such as Saudi Arabia). In 
November 2001, 300 metric tons of shrimp 
shipped from China to the EU were discovered to 
contain 0.2 parts per billion [ppbj of chlor­
amphenicol. As a result, the EU suspended imports 
of Chinese products of animal origin intended for
human consumption or for use in animal feeds. 
Affected products included rabbit meat, poultry 
meat, and crustaceans such as shrimp and prawns. 
Exports of aquatic products to the EU slumped 
more than 40 percent from 193,000 metric tons in 
2001 to 110,000 metric tons in 2002. Meat exports 
to the EU dropped to 5,000 metric tons in 
2002—only 36 percent of the 2001 level. Follow­
ing the EU ban, other countries, including 
Hungary, Japan, Russia, and the United Arab 
Emirates, implemented stricter inspections of meat 
and fishery products from China.
In April 2004 the European Commission issued 
Commission Decision 2004/432/EC listing the 
names of countries approved by the Commission 
with regard to the submission of monitoring plans 
and the categories of products approved. China is 
on the list of countries with approved products 
covering only pigs and sheep. Since then the EU 
has approved two modifications to the list of coun­
tries and products. In the list revised in May 2005, 
China's residue-monitoring plans for pig and sheep 
products, poultry, fishery products, rabbit meat, 
and honey were approved.
On the basis of Commission Decision 
2005/573/EC published in July 2005, the EU 
completely lifted the import ban on fishery 
products (except aquaculture fishery products and 
shrimp], gelatin, and pet food from China. For 
some other products, including aquaculture fishery 
products, shrimp (including peeled shrimp and 
crayfish], casings, rabbit meat, honey, and royal 
jelly, China must meet not only the general regula­
tions for EU imports from third countries, but also 
new regulations specifically for China. In other 
words, the EU member states can authorize 
imports of products only if they are accompanied 
by a declaration from the relevant Chinese authori­
ties stating that before being dispatched, each con­
signment has been subjected to a chemical test to 
ensure that the products do not present a danger 
to human health.
Honey and Tea
Honey and tea are two traditional Chinese staple 
export products. Since 2002, however, exports of 
honey and tea from China to the EU, Japan, and 
the United States have been drastically reduced 
owing to the new food safety standards in these 
markets. In February 2002 the EU banned imports
of honey from China after finding chloramphenicol 
(CAP] at levels higher than 0.1 part per billion 
(ppb]. Following the EU ban, Japan and the United 
States increased their controls and tests of honey 
from China. For example, in May 2002 the U.S. 
FDA lowered the maximum level of chloram­
phenicol residue in Chinese honey to 0.3 ppb and 
claimed that the standard may be increased to 0.1 
ppb. Following the adjustment, China's honey 
exports to the United States dropped from 15,000 
metric tons in 2001 to less than 8,000 metric tons 
in 2002. Honey exports to Japan also decreased in 
2002, though to a lesser extent.
Other countries have also banned or set higher 
standards for China's honey exports. For example, 
Saudi Arabia, which had imported about 200 
metric tons of honey from China annually, imposed 
a complete ban in 2002. On June 2, 2002, Mexico 
ordered 356 metric tons of contaminated Chinese 
honey to be sent back or destroyed. Canada began 
stricter inspection for antibiotics in Chinese honey 
starting February 20, 2002, and required testing 
for the residue of phenol and 19 kinds of sulphanil- 
amide (SNJ. Exports of honey to Canada decreased 
from almost 5,000 metric tons in 2001 to a little 
more than 1,000 metric tons in 2002.
A similar situation occurred for China's tea 
exports. The EU and Japan, the two largest 
importers of China's tea, have increased the 
standards for testing pesticide residues in tea in 
recent years. From 1999 to 2002, the number of 
pesticide residues tested for by the EU increased 
from 7 to 191. The criteria in terms of maximum 
residue limits (MRLs] are also becoming much 
stricter. For example, the MRL for fenvalerate in 
EU went from 10 ppm in the 1990s to 0.01 ppm in 
2002. After the withdrawal of authorizations for 
plant protection products containing endosulfan, 
the EU reduced the MRL for endosulfan in tea 
from 30 ppm to 0.01 ppm, making the new 
standard 3,000 times stricter than the original one 
and much stricter than the prevailing international 
standard (30 ppm, according to the Codex 
Alimentarius],
Japan has also strengthened its inspection of tea 
imports, especially those from China. With the 
amendment of its food hygiene law on November 
8, 2002, Japan had MRLs for 108 pesticide residues 
for China's tea exports. With the introduction in 
Japan of the Positive List System of Agricultural
Chemical Residues in Foods on May 29, 2006, 448 
pesticides are on the list for screening and 276 
residue limits are listed for tea. Following the 
implementation of stricter inspection standards, 
China's tea exports to the EU and Japan decreased 
by more than 30 percent and 20 percent, respec­
tively, in 2002 compared with 2001.
Policy Issues
Problems with the Regulatory System
The most salient feature of China's food safety 
regulatory system is the fragmentation of regula­
tory authority among different government agen­
cies. Currently the Ministry of Health [MOH], the 
Ministry of Agriculture [MOA], the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, 
and Quarantine [GAQSIQ], the State Administra­
tion for Industry and Commerce [SAIC], the Minis­
try of Commerce [MOC], and the State Food and 
Drug Administration [SFDA] are actively involved 
in regulating food safety. This fragmentation of the 
food safety regulatory system presents a challenge 
for regulatory implementation. In some cases there 
may be excessive enforcement; in others, shirking 
of responsibility and shifting of blame [Tam and 
Yang 2005],
China has enacted many laws and regulations on 
food and agricultural production, and many of 
them are outdated, repetitive, and inconsistent with 
or less restrictive than international standards. For 
example, with respect to restrictions on pesticide 
residues, the Codex Alimentarius has set up more 
than 2,500 maximum residue levels, the EU has 
more than 22,000, Japan has more than 10,000, 
and the United States has more than 8,600, 
whereas China has only 484, and fewer than 20 
percent of these conform to Codex levels (Dong 
and Jensen 2004J. Moreover, the establishment of 
agricultural standards and food safety controls in 
China involves multiple government ministries and 
agencies, with little coordination from the central 
government down to the county level. As a result, 
each level of government has developed its own 
standards creating a dispersed regulatory structure 
that neither facilitates coordination nor supports 
effective implementation of food safety regulations.
The lack of effective regulation of quality standards 
and a supervision system to control agricultural 
production and processing has led to substantial
noncompliance with regulations. Problems with 
farmers misusing or abusing chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, and antibiotics are particularly acute. 
According to inspection reports of produce 
sampled by the GAQSIQ in 2001, 86 of 181 vegeta­
ble samples contained excessive pesticide residues. 
Among them, three prohibited hazardous pesti­
cides'—rogor, carbofuran, and isocarbophos—were 
found in 25, 18, and 16 samples, respectively (Dong 
and Jensen 2004], Noncompliance also occurs at 
the processing and marketing stage. Some "ques­
tionable" food-processing procedures currently 
reported in China include sleeve-fish preserved in 
formalin, bamboo shoots kept fresh with industrial 
sulfur, cuttlefish dyed with ink, and moldy oranges 
covered with a coating of paraffin. In 2005 the 
GAQSIQ tested 2,000 processed food samples and 
found one-fifth of them below state-imposed 
quality standards (China Daily 2005aJ.
Lack of Knowledge
A lack of basic knowledge on food safety contri­
butes to China's current SPS situation. Apart from 
moral reasons, farmers and food industry workers 
who are not aware of the importance of food 
safety may not discipline themselves to meet the 
standards. Consumers may not demand or are 
unwilling to pay more for safety features 
incorporated in food because they do not know 
the importance of safe food for human health. 
Agricultural producers and processors who are not 
aware of the changes in food safety requirements 
taking place in domestic and foreign markets may 
make the wrong decisions for improving their 
business.
In recent years, following a series of food scandals, 
there has been an increase in food safety awareness 
among China's urban residents. But for most 
Chinese small-scale farmers, food safety education 
and technical training is still lacking. Some farmers 
are not able to follow instructions for pesticide use, 
whereas others do not have enough knowledge or 
expertise to identify the risks of pests or diseases. 
In both cases, farmers tend to misuse or overuse 
pesticides. Farmers often do not know when their 
products are safe to be harvested after the pesti­
cides are used, and there is no testing available at 
the farm level, especially for small farmers.
Small Production Scale
The small scale of agricultural and food production 
in China, as well as the fact that producers are rela­
tively scattered across producing areas, contributes 
to the abuse of agricultural chemicals and other 
hazardous materials. In 2004 the GAQSIQ sur­
veyed producers [including farmers and processors] 
of rice, wheat flour, cooking oil, soy sauce, and 
vinegar products. Of these, 79 percent were family 
businesses with fewer than 10 workers each. Nearly 
16 percent of them were producing without a 
license, and quality control and safety inspections 
were nonexistent in 64 percent of them [China 
Dai/y2005a).
Food safety control in a country with a farm 
population of more than 600 million and countless 
household farming operations is a difficult, if not 
impossible, task given China's current financial and 
institutional capacity. The fragmented food supply 
chain, from planting, raising, harvesting, transporta­
tion, storage, processing, and, eventually, to the 
delivery of finished products to markets, makes it 
even more difficult to achieve traceable product 
flow and meet requirements for quality assurance. 
In addition, small-scale farmers themselves have 
little or no motivation to comply with SPS regula­
tions since compliance leads to higher production 
costs while noncompliance does not incur any 
penalties.
Environmental Problems
Increasing industrial pollution in China is also 
causing SPS problems. Polluted water and soil 
directly affect agricultural production. This pollu­
tion could be the reason that some testing results 
show noncompliance with lead [Pb] limits. For 
example, samples drawn from 220 million kilograms 
of crop production grown on 300,000 hectares of 
land in 2000 show that 10 percent of crop produc­
tion contained excessive levels of heavy metals 
[Dong and Jensen 2004], According to a recent 
estimate by the State Environmental Protection 
Administration [SEPA], 12 million tons of grain 
nationwide are polluted with heavy metals that have 
found their way into soil each year. Direct 
economic losses exceed 20 billion yuan [about 
US$2.5 billion] [Xinhua News Agency 2006],
Policy Options
The Public Sector
Organization and coordination. Since China has a 
multiagency system for food safety control, there 
is much overlap in the functioning of various agen­
cies and a lack of coordination between them (Tam 
and Yang 2005], There are also conflicts between 
governments at various administrative levels as a 
result of their potentially different policy goals. To 
improve the current institutional framework for 
China's food safety, the government should 
strengthen organization and coordination so that 
responsibilities for monitoring and controlling food 
safety are clearly specified and distributed among 
different ministries and agencies at different levels. 
For example, the Ministry of Agriculture should be 
responsible for enforcing food safety regulations 
during agricultural production and promoting 
good agricultural practices [GAPs]; the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection 
and Quarantine should coordinate and monitor 
activities in domestic food markets and for imports 
and exports; the Ministry of Health should be 
responsible for food safety at the consumption 
stage, and the State Food and Drug Administration 
should coordinate the relevant bureaucracies to 
draft laws and administrative regulations concerning 
food safety.
Food safety prom otion and inform ation sharing. 
Improving people's awareness about food safety is 
an important strategy for the government. Over 
the past few years, food safety awareness in China 
has increased, mostly owing to food scandals and 
mainly among urban consumers.6 To date, no mass 
media campaigns related to food safety have taken 
place in China, and information dissemination on 
food safety is limited in scale and usually dis­
organized. It is very important that the government 
can play a central role in promoting food safety
6 A national survey recently revealed that food safety has 
become the primary concern for China's urban residents. 
The survey covered 1,058 people from China's 10 major 
provinces and municipalities between June 16 and 26, 
2005. According to the survey, public awareness of food 
safety issues increased after several serious food scandals, 
including the use of the cancer-causing Sudan 1 red dye 
by Kentucky Fried Chicken [KFC] and a subsidiary of 
U.S.-based Heinz, the addition of excessive iodine to 
infant formula by Nestle, and the reprocessing of out-of- 
date milk by Bright Dairy [China DaiiylOOSb).
through activities such as general education about 
hygiene in the workplace and on the farm, educa­
tion for farmers about the safe use of pesticides, 
integrated pest management [IPM], and GAPs, and 
news paper, TV or web-based information sharing 
about food safety for the general public. Promotion 
of food safety in agri-food business should be 
accompanied by the establishment of alert systems 
and databases about possible health hazards. This 
can help industry improve product quality and 
prevent and control food safety hazards. In the 
trade arena, a food safety notification and inquiry 
system maintained by the government [such as the 
GAQSIQ's WTO TBT/SPS enquiry point] can 
better assist importers and exporters in obtaining 
up-to-date information on domestic and foreign 
regulatory changes.
Food safety m onitoring. Monitoring is critical for 
creating food safety related data, setting relevant 
policies and targets, and prioritizing measures for 
supervision and enforcement. To enhance food 
safety monitoring and testing capacity, the Chinese 
authorities have established many laboratories at 
different levels of government. While good infra­
structure building is important, a narrow emphasis 
on investment is not enough. The critical issue now 
in China is how to use these available resources 
efficiently and effectively. So far a lack of qualified 
technicians and relevant expertise presents a bigger 
constraint than a lack of advanced testing equip­
ment and facilities. Therefore, China needs to invest 
more on personnel training on new analysis tech­
nology, methods, and operation of monitoring and 
testing devices.
Good food safety monitoring also requires an effi­
cient data gathering system. Without such a sys­
tem, consistent and reliable data will be unavailable 
and evidence-based interventions will be impossible. 
A monitoring and surveillance system employing 
sentinel sites and regional and national laboratory 
networks as well as food safety agencies at different 
administrative levels would serve the purpose. Since 
many entities are involved in this system, it is 
important to ensure that the whole system is 
transparent, its functionings are science-based, the 
subsystems are comparable, and, hence, the moni­
toring results are credible. Currently, China does 
not have an efficient monitoring system, which has 
led to a paucity of scientific data related to food 
safety. By reevaluating the existing system in the 
areas such as the sampling frames, testing methods,
data analyses, lab capacities, and management and 
personnel skills and by better integrating the 
efforts of different departments and central and 
local labs, the government can develop an improved 
monitoring network that benefit both domestic and 
export markets.
The Private Sector
Foreign d irect investm ent and "dragon-head" 
enterprises. To develop the infrastructure required 
to support better food safety control, China needs 
to find a way to increase investment in agriculture. 
Given limited domestic funding resources, the 
government should continue to attract foreign 
investments, and in particular, foreign direct 
investments [FDI], It is believed that the FDI, as 
compared to other types of investments, can not 
only introduce stable capital inflows but also bring 
advanced technology and management and 
marketing skills that are essential for improving 
product quality, increasing exports, and assisting in 
the transition from traditional to modern agricul­
tural operations. In addition to encouraging FDI, 
the government needs to support the development 
of large-scale rural firms, or "dragon-head" enter­
prises, because they play an important role in the 
industrialization of the agricultural system and the 
linkage between farmers and markets.7
Both the FDI and dragon-head enterprises can help 
millions of small-scale farmers who have low man­
agement skills and poor production techniques to 
comply with stricter food safety requirements and 
remain competitive in the international markets.8 *
Through contracts or other arrangements, small- 
scale farmers are linked to Iarger-scale production 
and processing which allow them to gain economies 
of scale, acquire modern production and manage­
ment skills and adapt to more standardized produc­
tion procedures. This means farmers can now meet
7 Enterprises are registered and attached to administrative 
levels based on figures including turnover, profits, 
market share, taxes paid, and growth rates. Dragon-head 
enterprises are specific to agriculture, as they must have 
contact with or lead along a large number of farmers and 
contribute to agro-industrialization and vertical integra­
tion. Dragon-head enterprises are commonly eligible for 
preferential tax treatment, preferential access to loans, 
and invitations to join official meetings and delegations.
8 There are concerns about whether FDI and dragon-head 
enterprises can actually benefit small farmers. Some argue
that farmers get little assistance in terms of inputs, tech­
nology, and marketing (Huang et al. 2006],
food safety standards more easily and with lower 
costs. Currently the involvement of FDI and 
dragon-head enterprises is disproportionately con­
centrated in China's coastal region while the share 
of agriculture in total FDI is relatively low [about 5 
percent]. Additional polices are needed to direct 
more FDI to the agricultural sector and to nurture 
more dragon-head enterprises in the inland regions.
HACCP, GAP, and GMP. Agro-food businesses in 
China should consider implementing standardized 
food safety control procedures as another poten­
tially useful approach to reducing SPS problems. 
The Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
[HACCP] system is one of those international 
recognized procedures.9 The HACCP system 
requires identification of critical control points and 
development of procedures for monitoring con­
trols and addressing any failures in control. Often, 
firms are given some flexibility in determining 
control points and critical limits, so implementation 
of HACCP is adaptable to many different contexts. 
The imposition of regulations mandating the 
HACCP system reflects a growing recognition that 
it is important to prevent and control food safety 
hazards before they reach the consumer.
Given the fact that not all food producers and 
processors are required to adopt HACCP, the 
responsibility for improving SPS conditions will also 
come through self- or market-oriented disciplines 
such as good agricultural practices [GAPs] and 
good manufacturing practices [GMPs]. GAPs and 
GMPs principles provide food growers and manu­
facturers with guidelines to reduce the potential 
contamination of their products. Guidelines cover 
growing, harvesting, sorting, packing, and storage 
operations. National-level guidelines on GAPs and 
GMPs enhance the consistency and scientific basis 
of food safety programs developed by public and 
private institutions. Producers' adoption of good 
practices such as GAPs and GMPs can be 
promoted by the government or motivated by the 
promise of earning more returns by selling 
products of higher quality and safety.
9 China first adopted the HACCP system in the produc­
tion of aquatic products and later introduced it to other 
foods including canned food, meat and meat products, 
frozen vegetables, fruit/vegetable juice, and frozen con­
venience food containing meat or aquatic products. The 
use of the HACCP system is primarily export oriented, 
although in recent years there an increasing demand for 
this certification for domestically consumed products.
Supply chain management. Experience has shown 
that coordinated and integrated supply chains are 
crucial for participation in modern food markets 
since they provide an efficient and effective tool 
for food quality and safety control. But to date in 
China, coordinated supply chains handle a relatively 
small percentage of food.10 In cases where coor­
dinated supply chains are established, they are 
mostly within the export sector, which have 
received valuable support from foreign partners. To 
create an overall environment of enhanced food 
safety, it is important for the whole agriculture 
sector to adopt modern supply chain management 
and strengthen the participation of small-scale 
farmers.
Although private enterprises and their partners 
have primary responsibility for setting up and 
managing coordinated supply chains and safety 
management programs, proper government sup­
port is also important. To avoid creating unneces­
sary market distortions, the government's sup­
porting role should focus on a good investment 
climate for coordinated supply chains, especially 
legal and regulatory issues, infrastructure, a skilled 
labor force, and relevant business services. Privately 
maintained supply chain schemes from the world's 
leading food importers as well as other well-estab­
lished supply chain with independent accreditation 
and certification, such as under the British Retail 
Consortium [BRC] or Euro-Retailer Produce GAP 
[EUREPGAP], can help domestic firms meet high 
food safety standards with limited public sector 
intervention. It is therefore important for the 
government to enhance the formation and func­
tioning of these types of coordinated supply chains.
Assignment
Your assignment is to develop strategies that China 
can use to enhance its capacity to meet food 
export quality standards, taking into account the
10 Although upstream segments of the supply chain have 
evolved dramatically in China in the past 20 years, agri­
cultural marketing is still dominated by the sales of 
farmers to small wholesalers and small traders. There is 
little penetration of the new retailing institutions because 
of high transaction costs between modern retailers and 
small farmers, and buyers play little role in providing 
technology, inputs, technical advice, or credit [Huang et 
al. 2006],
financial, institutional, and technical constraints it is
facing.
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